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A B S T R A C T   
Legal decision-making often relies on scientific knowledge and information of other kinds, not least in envi-
ronmental law where legal institutions use environmental modeling to, for example, project expected effects of 
projects when approving or denying permits. In this paper, using use the problem-feeding model of inter-
disciplinarity, we analyze this relationship as an exchange of problems and solutions between different com-
munities of expertise. Drawing on recent examples from Finland, we use the problem-feeding model to explore 
the conditions under which problem-solution coordination breaks down. We argue that tensions between the 
notions of uncertainty used by the different communities of expertise can lead to differing understandings of the 
way the relationship between legal institutions and scientific experts works, and that this may disrupt the orderly 
exchange of problems and solutions. We illustrate our views in a fictional discussion between a lawyer and a 
modeler.   
1. Introduction 
The law often turns on scientific knowledge (Feldman, 2009). This 
can be seen both in the legislative phase, where scientific information is 
used by law-makers trying to assess what should be regulated and how, 
and in the application of the law in individual cases. Nowhere is this 
relationship more evident than in environmental law, where the legis-
lature relies on scientific guidance and where legal judgements are often 
conditional, in part or in whole, on scientific assessments (Rose, 2005; 
Ruhl, 2007; Fisher et al., 2017; Bjornlund et al., 2018). Thus, whether or 
not a new infrastructural or industrial operation is authorized will often 
depend on a range of long-term risk and damage assessments focusing on 
various environmental values. Where legal protections for the environ-
ment have been established (e.g., an obligation in law not to pollute the 
environment), those tasked with deciding whether to grant permits or 
other authorizations for a project tend to base their decisions largely on 
scientific evidence. 
This raises familiar issues about the appropriate relationship be-
tween legal decision-making and the production and transfer of scien-
tific knowledge. How does this division of labor work? How should it? 
As Robin Feldman (2009), J. B. Ruhl (2007) and Carol Rose (2005) have 
pointed out, the relationship is not without its share of problems and 
challenges. A recurring issue is the failure to maintain appropriate 
boundaries between legal and policy matters, on the one hand, and 
science, on the other (Feldman, 2009; Ruhl, 2007). Legal problems are 
often, as Feldman puts it, inappropriately externalized as scientific 
problems, when the source of the problem is actually normative. 
Another issue arises from a lack of question-answer coordination be-
tween legal and scientific collaborators (Wahlberg, 2010). Key concepts, 
such as adaptivity, uncertainty, and even causality, are interpreted 
differently in legal and scientific contexts in subtle but consequential 
ways. This can lead to what some have called Type-III errors, where the 
right answer is provided to the wrong question (Mitroff and Feath-
eringham, 1974; Kriebel et al., 2001; Wahlberg and Persson, 2017). 
The purpose of this paper is to structure the problem situation ac-
cording to the problem-feeding model of interdisciplinarity (Thorén and 
Persson, 2013). We use this model to provide some analytical clarity and 
to generate normative conclusions about how to structure the relation-
ship between environmental law and natural science appropriately and 
effectively. For context, we refer to the implementation of the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC) in Finland and case law from 
the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first illustrate the chal-
lenge of communicating effectively across the law and natural science 
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divide by describing a case from the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Finland. We then introduce the problem-feeding concept. The aim here 
is to highlight problem-solving dynamics and problem-solution coordi-
nation between different communities of expertise, and the general 
challenges involved with that. We then discuss variation in un-
derstandings of uncertainty. We explain that this variation can result in 
the usual way of organizing the boundary between legal and scientific 
institutions breaking down. In the section that follows we illustrate these 
problems in more concrete terms by setting out a fictional conversation 
between a legal scholar and a natural scientist. The aim is to apply the 
philosophical, problem-feeding framework in a way that helps to explain 
the successes and failures of an interdisciplinary exchange in a real-life 
decision-making context. Finally, we speculate about the underlying 
reasons for the (potential) breakdown of the problem-feeding structure. 
Here we rely on some recent (and not so recent) discussions of inductive 
risks and the science-policy interface in the philosophy of science. 
2. Setting the Stage: cross-disciplinary expectations 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland 
(SACF 2019:166) ruled against the pulp manufacturer Finnpulp. The 
company had intended to make a 1.4 billion euro investment into a new 
bioeconomy operation producing pulp and renewable energy from 
timber. Section 27 of the Environmental Protection Act of Finland (527/ 
2014) required Finnpulp to obtain an environmental permit. The permit 
would ensure that the negative environmental impacts of emissions to 
air, soil and water would be controlled. The company had submitted a 
permit application to the relevant national authority, which had granted 
the permit provided that the company followed certain requirements 
mitigating emissions to the environment. The Supreme Administrative 
Court was asked to review the legality of this permit decision. Its job, in 
other words, was to determine whether or not the Finnpulp operation 
should be issued with an environmental permit. In order to decide the 
legality of the permit application, the court was invited to assess the 
long-term environmental impact of the operation on the ecological 
functioning of the lake that would hold the project’s nutrient (especially 
phosphorus) and sulfate rich wastewaters. Finnpulp had conducted an 
environmental impact assessment using computer models designed to 
predict how the water quality and ecological functioning of the nearby 
lake would change as a consequence of the proposed project. 
The court rejected Finnpulp’s permit application, affirming that 
Finnpulp had a strict legal obligation not to reduce the ecological quality 
of the lake and citing significant model uncertainties regarding the 
ecological condition of the lake over the long term (Belinskij and Soi-
ninen, 2020; Paloniitty and Kotamäki, 2021). Without the permit, the 
project could not proceed. The conditions for granting an environmental 
permit are that the activity, alone or in combination with other activ-
ities, taking permit regulations and the location of the activity into ac-
count, does not cause significant pollution of the environment 
(Environmental Protection Act, Section 49 and 5). This provision is 
interpreted in the light of art. 4 of the EU Water Framework Directive 
stipulating that “Member States shall implement the necessary measures 
to prevent deterioration of the status of all bodies of surface water”. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union clarified in the Weser case 
(C-461/13) that WFD art. 4 applies to permits for operations causing 
environmental pollution. According to the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Finland, an environmental permit must be denied if there is a 
risk that the ecological status of the water body would deteriorate within 
the timespan of the proposed project (40–50 years into the future). 
While the court does not explicitly discuss tolerable risk levels in 
quantitative terms, in the Finnpulp case the best available water quality 
models were not able to meet the legal standard of scientific certainty. 
Consequently, the permit was denied in line with the precautionary 
principle. 
In light of the Finnpulp case we can ask: What are the more general 
prospects of scientific models meeting legal standards and tolerances for 
(un)certainty? Does legal regulation of environmental quality ask too 
much of science? It is also interesting to ask whether the scientific 
modelers tasked with predicting the aquatic impact of the project 40–50 
years into the future regarded the legal requirements for models to be 
scientifically feasible. Were they persuaded that the legal standard for 
certainty would not be entirely beyond their reach? We shall now set out 
the philosophical framework of problem-feeding that we believe illu-
minates the law and natural science interface, both in the Finnpulp case 
and in environmental law more broadly. 
3. The problem-feeding model 
The pattern the Finnpulp example illustrates is as follows. Questions 
are formulated (when problems arise) in one context, or community, 
that cannot be addressed without expertise from some other community. 
The questions are therefore put to the relevant community, with the 
expectation that this will solve the problem, and in this sense the 
problem is “transferred”. Such an exchange of problems and solutions 
has been called problem-feeding—or bilateral problem-feeding, to be 
more precise (Persson et al., 2018; Thorén, 2015; Thorén and Persson, 
2013). It has been applied in analysis of the dependence relationship 
that obtains between law and science (Wahlberg and Persson, 2017). 
The issue is that actors, or communities, that differ in a number of 
relevant dimensions need to collaborate towards specific goals. In the 
Finnpulp case there are legal actors (the courts) and scientific actors 
(modelers). In this paper, we will use the terms discipline and community 
of expertise, depending on the context. We shall treat these terms as 
largely interchangeable—both refer to groups bound together by tech-
nical and theoretical expertise, shared theories, models, concepts, and 
values (Bechtel, 1986; Kuhn, 1993). Among other things, this makes a 
community of expertise suitable to solve particular sets of problems.1 
3.1. The basic structure 
Problem-feeding involves the exchange of problems and solutions. 
The structure of the exchange is as follows. We have two disciplines, D1 
and D2, that are assumed to be different and complementary with 
respect to the knowledge they can produce such that one can be 
dependent on another. That is to say, a problem or question may arise in 
one discipline that can only be addressed or answered in the other. The 
overall pattern is simple:   
(1) A problem P arises in D1 such that it can only be solved in D2.  
(2) D2 proceeds to provide a solution S to P.  
(3) S is implemented in D1. 
In the kind of case in which we are interested the law is such that 
courts (D1 in the above schema) have questions that they cannot (and 
should not) answer on their own, such as “What are the long-term effects 
of activity X in environment Y?” These are transferred to the appropriate 
scientists (in this case, ecological modelers) who provide answers that 
are then used to support legal decision-making by the courts. If the risk 
of environmental impacts of a proposed activity rises beyond a certain 
threshold, it is deemed too severe and the permit is denied. In an ideal 
world the division of labor between the legal and the scientific com-
munities is clear; the permit-issuing authorities and courts know what 
kind of scientific knowledge is needed and what the best available sci-
ence can be expected to deliver, and the scientists (often consultants 
1 Legal and scientific institutions can also be differentiated in other ways. 
Moreover, in reality (in Finland) there is a grey area at the institutional joint 
that connects legal and scientific institutions most notably exemplified by the 
presence of expert judges that also have scientific training (see Paloniitty and 
Kotamäki, 2021). 
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conducting environmental impact assessments for the permit applicant) 
know what is expected of them in the legal evaluation and can live up to 
that expectation. 
When the exchange works in this way, we call it bilateral problem- 
feeding. That is to say, it is problem-feeding plus solution-feeding 
(Thorén and Persson, 2013). In situations where the solution (for 
whatever reason) is not implemented in the intended way or is 
completely ignored by the discipline within which the original problem 
arose, we say that the problem-feeding was unilateral. There is nothing 
inherently lacking about unilateral problem-feeding as such, but a sit-
uation that only gives rise to this type of problem-feeding is of course a 
failure if bilateral problem-feeding was intended. It may be seriously 
concerning if an episode of problem-feeding is mistakenly understood to 
be bilateral – i.e., if the solution eventually produced does not address 
the original question, but this is not noticed for some reason. 
3.2. Transfers and transformation 
One important point is that, as we transfer problems and solutions 
between disciplines that operate with different theories or methods, 
and—at least, partially—on the basis of different sets of values (c.f. 
Kuhn, 1993), some measure of transformation or translation typically 
needs to take place. The point is simply that in order for scientists of any 
stripe to solve any problem, that problem has to be fitted to the 
problem-solving resources of the discipline in question (here: law) and 
its way of operating. There are many dimensions to this process, which 
involves expressing problems within the conceptual framework of the 
discipline in question and as varieties of problems that the discipline 
usually solves (see Thorén, 2015, chapter 5). The applied mathematician 
will understand any problem that she thinks she may be able to solve as a 
problem capable of being expressed in mathematical terms. Setting aside 
the intricacies of this process, it suffices to say that depending on how 
the problem is initially formulated, and whether there are already 
established conventions in place, this transformation can be more or less 
challenging. Once the problem is solved the solution needs to be trans-
ferred back with similar issues arising again. 
Developing the above schema somewhat, the process looks like this:  
(1) Problem Pa arises in discipline D1  
(2) Problem Pa is transferred to discipline D2 and transformed into 
problem Pb  
(3) Discipline D2 produces solution Sb to Pb 
(4) Sb is transferred back to discipline D1 and transformed into so-
lution Sa  
(5) Sa is a solution to Pa and is implemented in D1 
This bilateral process can be thought of as one of problem-solution 
coordination. In essence, the transformation processes must ensure 
that the product (the solution) meets the criteria specified in (5) in the 
right way. First, the problems and solutions that are transformed and 
produced need to remain coordinated such that Sa is indeed a solution to 
Pa in D1. Moreover, the process as a whole should lead to a solution of 
the kind generated when all of the steps in the process are actually 
warranted.2 
3.3. Prerequisites and expectations 
For bilateral problem-feeding to function in the intended way, a 
number of components need to be in place. This involves such things as 
aligning the values that guide inquiry, demarcating the disciplines with 
respect to one another (in respect of their domains of inquiry, epistemic 
jurisdiction, and methodological reach) and harmonizing epistemic 
standards, or alternatively establishing a relationship of trust between 
the involved parties, which ensures that the imported solutions are 
accepted as reliable (see Andersen and Wagenknecht, 2013; Thorén and 
Persson, 2013). 
In what follows we shall focus on the way the boundaries between 
communities of expertise are organized, and on what the collaborators 
believe about these boundaries. These beliefs shape expectations con-
cerning the structure of the problem-feeding exchange itself that will, if 
the beliefs are too far removed from the actuality of the situation (and 
are not appropriately updated), impede progress. 
Often it seems that dynamic exchanges of problems and solutions 
require one party to have an idea of what it needs in order to proceed, 
and each party to have certain expectations of the other with respect to 
what is forthcoming. This creates slightly more complicated problem- 
feeding chains. Before D2 can proceed with solving Pa (or a success-
fully transformed variety of that problem) some further information is 
necessary such that the members of D2 believe this information is 
forthcoming from D1. The problem is that it is not forthcoming, at least 
in a form that is useful within D2. In more complicated situations there 
can be mutual unresolved (or irresolvable) dependencies of this kind 
where collaborating disciplines are locked in a kind of holding pattern 
awaiting further instructions. 
The problem here is that the collaborators are operating with a 
“model” of the interdisciplinary environment—the relationship between 
the interacting parties (here: law and environmental science) and the 
capabilities of their counterparts—that is at odds with the reality. Notice 
that, in most cases, it will require some effort to understand the capa-
bilities and limitations of another discipline. Of course, the image of 
other specialties presented in a specific discipline need not be wholly 
accurate, but some understanding of the other discipline is required for 
successful problem and solution-feeding. 
To take a practical example, legal frameworks are deeply intertwined 
with science and scientific knowledge in many ways, and it is easy to see 
why the boundaries here might become hazy or unclear. A good illus-
tration of this is the Water Framework Directive mentioned earlier. The 
directive seeks to 1) prevent deterioration of the status of ground, sur-
face and coastal waters within the EU, and 2) achieve good status in the 
said waters (art. 4). WFD deploys scientific criteria for classifying 
ecological status—what Feldman would call internalization. Ecological 
status has three quality elements: biological (BQEs), physico-chemical 
and hydro-morphological. Good Ecological Status requires, at a gen-
eral level, that the BQEs show only a low level of distortion resulting 
from human activity. With regard to fish fauna, for instance, Good 
Ecological Status requires that there are only slight changes in species 
composition and abundance attributable to anthropogenic impacts 
(WFD Annex V). 
The Water Framework Directive and the national laws implementing 
it also externalize legal problems about ecological status, transferring 
them to science (Hering et al., 2010a,b; Carvalho et al., 2019). In 2015, 
the EU Court of Justice ruled that national authorities shall not grant 
environmental permits to projects that would lead to a deterioration in 
water status or jeopardize the achievement of good status as measured 
by the directive (C-461/13). This ruling resulted in the denial of a permit 
in the SACF Finnpulp case. When national permit-issuing authorities and 
courts are asked to establish whether a project satisfies the directive’s 
requirements, ecological modelers are asked to simulate and predict 
how the project would alter the biological, physico-chemical and 
hydro-morphological quality elements of the water body. The models 
are decisive in establishing whether the project can be legally approved, 
and, if so, with what conditions (Belinskij and Soininen, 2020; Paloniitty 
and Kotamäki, 2021). Unsurprisingly, the SACF Finnpulp ruling hinged 
largely on whether the scientific water quality models were fit for 
2 For example, the transformation process by which solutions are re- 
interpreted within the framework of the discipline or community of expertise 
in which the original problem arose shouldn’t be such that it will transform 
anything into something that counts as a solution Pa which would render the 
whole exercise superfluous as well as violate some of our initial stipulations (i. 
e., that D1 is not able to solve the problem on its own). 
H. Thorén et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Environmental Science and Policy 124 (2021) 478–484
481
purpose, and whether they could predict the future ecological condition 
of the lake with sufficient certainty. The court seems, then, to have 
externalized a legal question about whether to grant a permit, and 
whether the project would infringe the requirements of the Water 
Framework Directive and the CJEU Weser ruling, to scientific experts, 
both within the court (expert judges) and without the court (modelers). 
Interestingly, the Finnpulp case illustrates the way in which 
problem-feeding fails when the problem-feeding is not connected to 
solution-feeding. The ruling left the scientific modelers deeply confused 
as to what is expected of them in terms of model certainty, and how they 
could ever achieve such high standards given environmental complex-
ities and change, and scientific uncertainty. In the next section, we try to 
clarify where and how, exactly, the failure of problem-feeding and 
solution-feeding originates. 
4. A dialogue between a legal scholar and an ecological modeler 
The previous sections have established that legal texts, such as the 
Water Framework Directive and the Environmental Protection Act of 
Finland, and legal institutions, such as the permit-issuing authorities and 
courts, proceed on the basis that science, in this case aquatic ecosystem 
modelling, can provide answers concerning environmental quality with 
sufficient certainty. Our point is that laws are drafted with a particular 
idea of what environmental science as a discipline can provide in terms 
of knowledge. But the way in which ecology operates, and how it deals 
with uncertainties, often makes it unable to offer this product—there is a 
lack of problem-solution coordination that, we shall suggest, flows from 
discrepancies in the way in which uncertainties are managed. 
Before we turn to the fictional exchange between a legal scholar and 
a natural scientist, based on the SACF Finnpulp-case, let us remind the 
reader of the kind of situation in which we are interested. Project 
developer X has scoped various locations in Finland to set up a sizable 
bioeconomy operation producing pulp and renewable energy. X has 
finalized the engineering plans for the operation, conducted an Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment and discusses suitable locations for the 
operation with a municipality responsible for land-use planning. Section 
27 of the Environmental Protection Act of Finland requires such a 
project to have an environmental (pollution control) permit. The permit 
can only be granted if the project is not likely to cause significant 
pollution of the environment (sections 49 and 5). 
The dialogue opens with the interlocutors considering the following 
question: Is the granting of an environmental permit for a project 
emitting nutrient and sulfite rich waste waters into a lake legally justi-
fied? This question then extends to a problem-solution dialogue between 
the court (the “legal scholar”) and the environmental scientist (the 
“modeler”).3 
QUESTION Legal Scholar: Is the project likely to cause signifi-
cant pollution of the lake? In environmental cases like this, the permit- 
issuing authority and the courts reviewing permit decisions are inter-
ested in whether the proposed project is likely to cause significant 
pollution of waters (section 49) within the timespan of the project (here: 
40–50 years). According to section 5 of the Environmental Protection 
Act, “environmental pollution means such emissions that either alone or 
together with other emissions: a) cause harm to health; b) are detri-
mental to nature and how it functions; c) prevent or materially hinder 
the use of natural resources; d) cause a loss of general amenity of the 
environment or of special cultural values; e) reduce the suitability of the 
environment for general recreational use; f) cause damage or harm to 
property or impairment of use; or g) constitute a comparable violation of 
the public or private interest.” In this case, the interest is in “emissions 
that are detrimental to nature and how it functions”. This is evaluated in 
light, especially, of whether the project is likely to reduce the ecological 
status of the water or jeopardize the achievement of good status as 
explained by the Water Framework Directive. 
ANSWER Modeler: The project’s impacts on the water body have 
been assessed and quantified with pressure-impact models. The 
reason the legal institution turns to modelers in the first place is that 
mathematical models are the dominant scientific method for assessing, 
predicting and understanding the links between human actions and the 
state of an ecological system (Schmolke et al., 2010). They are widely 
used in water management planning and permissions (Fisher et al., 
2015; Hering et al., 2010a; Rekolainen et al., 2003). In the impact 
assessment, the modeler quantitatively links the indicators of interest 
and the pressures that affect these indicators. The established model will 
be used for simulating a range of options: assessing the water quality 
without the planned project, and then with the alternative sizes and 
locations for the project. In this way it is possible to distinguish between 
the impacts of the proposed project and other natural and anthropogenic 
pressures. However, what, exactly, the modeler is capable of delivering 
is constrained by the models that are available, the representativeness of 
the local calibration/validation data, and the resources that are avail-
able for making the assessments (time, money and experience). 
QUESTION Legal Scholar: I’m expecting your model to clarify 
long-term effects on the lake’s ecological status. Is this possible? To 
quantitatively assess impacts on an ecosystem in various situations we 
need simple and easily interpreted proxies of the environment, i.e., 
ecological indicators (Jackson et al., 2000). The guidelines for selecting 
such indicators are set by legislation, here in the Water Framework 
Directive. In practice, they are a co-production of science and policy, as 
they are shaped by both scientific knowledge and political consider-
ations and priorities (Turnhout et al., 2007). In lakes, the ecological 
status indicators are metrics of biological quality elements describing 
the amount and community composition of phytoplankton, macro-
phytes, benthic invertebrates and fish. The prescribed limits of Good 
Ecological Status must not be exceeded. The selection of the ecological 
indicators and their quality standards are defined in Annex V of WFD. 
ANSWER Modeler: To some extent, yes. However, the 40–50- 
year timescale is challenging and often not feasible. In addition, 
models and data seldom allow us to assess all the ecological quality 
metrics. The difficulty with the long-term predictions arises from the 
fact that the relationship between the functioning of the ecosystem and 
the physical environment is complex. Often there is not enough infor-
mation (e.g., historical data) to track trends, and the annual and sea-
sonal variations, and their drivers. Different parts of the ecosystem can 
react in different phases, and the changes can be slow or rapid. There-
fore, long-term impacts are often assessed with multiple model simula-
tions that vary in respect of biophysical conditions (with changes, for 
example, in temperature and precipitation, and in nutrient and oxygen 
availability). The worst-case scenario then sets the level of maximum 
impact. In addition, in the impact assessment there is rarely enough data 
and knowledge on the biological quality metrics. The models were 
developed and applied only for easily measurable physico-chemical 
parameters such as nutrient concentration and chlorophyll-a (Ander-
sen et al., 2016; Hjerppe et al., 2017). Moreover, the complexity, and 
thus the uncertainty, of the ecological, biogeochemical models is much 
higher than those of hydrodynamic, purely physical models. For these 
reasons, the impact assessments perhaps only partly deliver what the 
legal scholar requires. 
QUESTION Legal Scholar: Okay, but how reliable are the avail-
able model results? What is the risk of jeopardizing the Good 
Ecological Status of this waterbody? WFD art. 4 and the CJEU Weser 
ruling require there to be sufficient certainty that permitted projects will 
not reduce or jeopardize Good Ecological Status. 
ANSWER Modeler: The uncertainty is high. It is partly un-
avoidable and accumulates from several sources. Scientific 
3 This dialogue is based on the actual Finnish Supreme Administrative Court 
case referred to in the article (SACF 2019:166) and all the questions and an-
swers are based on sound existing research. The actual dialogue is, however, 
fictional and used here to explain and highlight what the problem between law 
and natural science is by using the problem-feeding model. 
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knowledge, including model assessments, always contain uncertainty 
(Uusitalo et al., 2015; Popper, 1959). Following the framework provided 
by, for example, Refsgaard et al. (2007), this ineliminable uncertainty 
can be divided into roughly two types, depending on its cause. The first 
is so-called aleatory, or stochastic, uncertainty, which is inherent in 
nature. Genuine aleatory uncertainty cannot be reduced, as it resides 
within the system itself. Often enough, however, this kind of uncertainty 
will produce stable frequencies, and it allows probabilistic treatment 
and can, if appropriate conditions obtain, be at least partly quantified 
and communicated to decision makers (Uusitalo et al., 2015). The other 
type of uncertainty is epistemic. In the case of modelling, this stems from 
insufficient knowledge of the system’s behavior, or inadequate empir-
ical measurements, among other things. Uncertainties in modelling are 
connected with issues including: i) complexity of the model structure 
(what is the appropriate level of simplicity when describing the real 
world with a model?), ii) spatio-temporal scale (what is the appropriate 
timeline and geographical resolution?), iii) availability and quality of 
data (is there enough input and output data to verify, calibrate and 
validate the model?), iv) numerical approximations (which arise espe-
cially in complex modelling of issues that cannot be solved analytically). 
In addition, issues with the confidence of the status assessment of the 
water body, and with complexities in the WFD classification system, 
introduce further uncertainty (Sigel et al., 2010). 
QUESTION Legal Scholar: Is it possible to reduce the uncer-
tainty, and consequently the risk, in the decision-making? Decision- 
making is easier when the certainty of the outcome is higher. The 
permit-issuing authority needs to know that the project is highly un-
likely to cause ecological deterioration or jeopardize the water’s good 
status, otherwise the permit decision may prove to be unlawful in the 
future. The legal standard of risk cannot, however, be established in 
quantifiable terms. What level of risk can be tolerated must be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. 
ANSWER Modeler: Yes, at least some of it. Some uncertainties can 
be reduced by improving the model structure and utilizing more (and 
more representative) measurement data. Modelling and data always go 
hand in hand, and local data are the basis of the model’s parametriza-
tion, calibration and validation (Rykiel, 1996). Data availability is also 
critical in model evaluation, i.e., when we are comparing the 
model-based predictions with empirically collected data from the proj-
ect site (Nichols et al., 2011; Carmona et al., 2013). To reduce uncer-
tainty, models can be updated whenever new data is available. The 
model assessment outputs will then become more accurate every time 
(but they can also change). Uncertainty in the model can be reduced 
somewhat, but it cannot be entirely eliminated. Significant uncertainty 
remains even after the model has been loaded with local data. Alea-
tory/stochastic uncertainty can be mitigated with more data but not 
removed. What we get with more data is a better understanding of the 
probabilities involved. Moreover, sometimes there are higher-order 
uncertainties—uncertainties about the uncertainties themselves—that 
can be difficult to capture within a simple framework for reporting 
uncertainty (e.g., Douglas, 2009; Frank, 2017). 
QUESTION Legal Scholar: How much uncertainty will remain if 
the permit applicant is required to gather more local data and 
update the model runs with these data? The system issuing in per-
missions contains some legal mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty. 
These include temporary permits, enhanced monitoring obligations and 
periodic modelling, coupled with a review of the permit conditions (e.g., 
Best Available Technology for water purification) (Paloniitty and 
Kotamäki, 2021). The problem is that in many cases (such as in mining 
operations and large industrial operations) the proposed project requires 
significant economic investment at the construction and set-up phase. 
Under the established constitutional and administrative law doctrine, 
the permit cannot be entirely revoked once the original go-ahead has 
been granted. This creates a risk that the project will end up infringing 
the requirements of WFD. The operation can, however, be down-scaled 
or required to obtain new technologies for purifying waste waters and 
the like. However, these may not be sufficient to meet WFD art. 4 re-
quirements. We would need scientific certainty, or at least confirmation 
that it is highly unlikely that the project will infringe WFD art. 4, for the 
models to deliver an answer that is fully justified in law to the question 
whether a permit should be granted. 
ANSWER Modeler: It is very hard to know the level of certainty 
prior to the assessments. Actually, it seems that the law has 
excessively high expectations about what our models can and 
should do. The requirement of producing long-term, cumulative and 
holistic assessments with enough certainty is not realistic. Modelers also 
struggle with qualitative expressions describing tolerable levels of risk 
and confidence. Moreover, it seems that although evaluative questions 
of “sufficiency” and “tolerability” need to be answered on legal grounds, 
modelers can only give the assessment results and explain the different 
sources of uncertainty. The modelers cannot, and should not, make the 
permit decision for the legal scholar, even if the decision seems to hinge 
on a scientific assessment of future ecological quality. 
ANSWER Lawyer: I agree. The evaluative decisions need to be 
made on legal grounds using legal criteria. This means that the 
permit-issuing authority, and the court reviewing the permit, are left 
without clear legal guidance on risk tolerance. Either the permit-issuing 
authority declines to grant the permit based on the precautionary 
principle (too much uncertainty to grant a permit), or it grants the 
permit based on its view that there is sufficient certainty and seeks to 
mitigate the remaining uncertainty with permit conditions, such as 
monitoring, modelling and BAT requirements. It is frustrating that there 
are no clear-cut answers. 
5. Uncertainty, values and inductive risks 
The above dialogue is fictional. It is descriptive in the sense that (in 
our view) it is reflective of the actual issues that arise as legal institutions 
and scientists attempt to set in motion problem-feeding exchanges. It 
also serves normatively as an illustration of the way uncertainties in 
models and their use in law can be interrogated by the involved parti-
es—a process which itself can aid the successful exchange of problems 
and solutions. 
The dialogue helps to make explicit some considerations regarding 
uncertainty. Obviously when expectations among the parties fail to map 
onto the actual situation, and when, moreover, these discrepancies are 
not appropriately recognized, the risk of the bilateral problem-feeding 
failure increases. 
Let us examine this kind of situation from a more general perspec-
tive. The “standard” model of the sharing of labor between legal and 
scientific institutions involves a somewhat sharp fact/value distinction. 
Although there are plenty of technical ways of defining the notions of 
risk and uncertainty in precise ways, we can generally separate two 
components that are important in decision-making situations. One is the 
probability of some outcome coming about. This may be expressed as an 
“objective” or “subjective” probability. The other part has to do with the 
value, or disvalue, of that outcome—how good or bad it is. In a con-
ventional decision framework such as expected utility theory we simply 
multiply the probability of an outcome with its value in order to 
compare uncertain (or better, risky) outcomes with one another. 
Where the science-policy interface is concerned, a traditional way of 
describing the relationship between scientific institutions, on the one 
hand, and decision makers (in the present case, legal institutions), on the 
other, is that the scientists provide the probabilities—which are taken to 
be matters of fact—and the decision makers provide the utilities, as 
these reflect values. Although much has been written about the various 
limitations of this model of the science-policy interface, it is quite clear 
that it very often serves as a model for organizing the division of labor in 
such a way as to both keep the science free of values (to the extent this is 
possible) and render the decision-making democratically legitimate. 
In the case we are focusing on, we can think of this as the model of 
the interdisciplinary/science-policy arrangement around which the 
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problem-feeding exchange is organized. Often enough, and perhaps 
especially if adequate institutional arrangements function to stabilize 
concepts and conventions, the model works well. In other words, it al-
lows for the appropriate exchange of problems. In some situations, 
however, the model fails to approximate the relationship between the 
different communities of expertise, and this can lead to failures of 
bilateral problem-feeding. 
The challenge the lawyer and the scientists are discussing in our 
fictional account revolves around the uncertainties themselves. On the 
standard model, these should be provided, or set out, by the scientists, 
but the form in which they are set out here fails to live up to the ex-
pectations of the lawyers. The two communities are operating with 
slightly different understandings of what counts as an adequate way of 
reporting uncertainties and maintaining the appropriate coupling be-
tween the respective communities of expertise. This in turn challenges 
the standard fact/value model of the science-policy interface through 
which our presumed discussants are operating. 
To find the reason for this, we can turn to the philosophical literature 
on inductive risk. The so-called argument from inductive risk was first 
formulated by Richard Rudner (1953). It states that when scientists are 
accepting and rejecting hypotheses in conditions of uncertainty they are 
effectively—and indeed should be—making value judgements by setting 
epistemic standards. The threshold of acceptance for a hypothesis is 
arbitrary, and the kind of error one prefers countenance (false positives 
or false negatives) should depend on what the practical consequences 
are. This argument was famously criticized by Richard Jeffreys (1956), 
who denied the premise that it is the task of scientists to accept or reject 
hypotheses. Instead they should merely report the (subjective) proba-
bility of some hypothesis being true. In this way, scientists leave value 
judgements to the decision makers with whom they rightly belong. 
Jeffreys proposal has by all accounts been widely influential, and it 
appears that often enough this is how, as a matter fact, we understand 
and structure exchanges between scientists and decision makers. The 
Jeffreyan model, however, appears to have limitations. A common 
counter-argument, and one that was to some extent anticipated by 
Rudner (see also Douglas, 2009; Frank, 2017), is that a statement to the 
effect that some hypothesis has a certain probability of being true is 
indeed also a hypothesis that needs to be accepted or rejected, and as 
such also subject to inductive risk considerations.4 As David Frank 
(2017) points out, the model only holds given that specific conditions 
apply. These are:  
(i) There must be an understanding of the way uncertainties are 
represented by decision makers.  
(ii) Scientists must not try to manipulate uncertainty representations 
in order to forward some particular agenda.  
(iii) It must be the case that the higher-order uncertainties are limited, 
and that the scientists are transparent about them. 
Given that we do not, in cases of the kind in which we are interested, 
typically suspect scientists of trying to manipulate their uncertainty 
reports—our point of departure is rather that scientists and modelers are 
generally trying to uphold what they perceive to be their part of the 
bargain by reporting uncertainties as objectively as possible—the most 
relevant conditions here are (i) and (ii). 
So, in the cases we are considering, a lack of understanding on the 
part of the decision makers, perhaps in combination with considerable 
higher-order uncertainties, makes it harder to maintain the fact/value 
distinction in the way the involved parties deem to be appropriate. 
Hence, either the decision makers have to make epistemic judgements, or 
the scientists have to make value judgments, or both. However, on the 
assumptions we are making here, this is not how they understand their 
respective roles. This, we suggest, is a compelling account of why these 
kinds of bilateral problem-feeding relationships sometimes malfunction. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Let us return to the Finnpulp case with which we introduced this 
account. The failure to successfully feed problems and solutions between 
the law and natural science, as illustrated by the Finnpulp case, is at its 
core a matter of the overinflated expectations the law has about what 
ecological models can deliver. Environmental laws, such as the Water 
Framework Directive and the Finnish Environmental Protection Act, are 
based on an understanding that objective knowledge of the natural 
world with a broad temporal scope is attainable: it is possible to know 
and predict the impact of anthropogenic pressures, such as the Finnpulp 
operation, well into the future with sufficient certainty. And if this is not 
possible, a court should err on the side of precaution in granting envi-
ronmental permits. Consequently, unless there is full certainty that a 
new project will not reduce water status or jeopardize the achievement 
of good water status, a permit should not be granted. This legal 
requirement, however, sets up an impossible task for any modeler 
seeking to satisfy the legal criterion of full certainty. Not understanding 
(or not caring enough about) the sources and scope of natural science’s 
uncertainties, the law ends up asking the impossible. In problem-feeding 
terms, the legal institutions ask the right questions of natural science, 
but the questions are charged with such unrealistic expectations that 
solution-feeding fails. As we suggested in the previous section, the un-
derlying reasons for this can be found in subtleties in the way second- 
order uncertainties interfere with the model of the interdisciplinary 
environment that the different communities of expertise are operating 
with. 
What should be done about such mismatches? Presumably no simple 
or easy solution is available. The models of interdisciplinarity and 
science-policy relations have to be brought in line with the reality of the 
situation. Typically, these kinds of issue are resolved by institutionally 
stabilized conventions that regulate and standardize the exchanges. 
Indeed, there is a real effort in Finland to bridge law and science. Permit- 
issuing authorities and the courts both have legally trained permit of-
ficials and judges, as well as officials and judges trained in natural sci-
ence or engineering. Despite such institutionalization of co-production, 
the Finnpulp case illustrates how the dialogue between law and natural 
science struggles (Paloniitty and Kotamäki, 2021). 
Being explicit about first- and second-order uncertainties also helps, 
but as several philosophers have pointed out (see e.g., Frank, 2017; 
Steele, 2012; Elliott, 2011) there may well be real trade-offs here, and 
these may mean that it is not possible to approximate to the Jeffreyan, 
value-free ideal closely. 
In practical terms, and in order to help alleviate the problem and 
facilitate solution-feeding between law and natural science, the legal 
community needs to clarify the level of certainty required, or at least 
establish what kinds of model can, and should, be used in assessing the 
potential environmental impact of the various types of project (regula-
tion of model choice). A complementary legal pathway would involve 
emphasizing the different legal mechanisms, such as monitoring and 
permit review, that can be used to limit uncertainty (regulation of un-
certainty). The scientific community, in turn, needs to be more trans-
parent about the different sources of uncertainty in their models 
(transparency). Moreover, the modelers should seek to better under-
stand the legal criteria for environmental permits, i.e., the purposes for 
which the models are used (matching legal criteria and models). 
Transparency will help the legal community to evaluate the reliability of 
the model outputs, and the scientists’ improved understanding of the 
decision-making context will help scientists choose the right models, 
acquire sufficient data and calibrate the model they apply, so that the 
legal requirements are more likely to be filled. These solutions will not 
offer silver bullets ensuring successful problem and solution-feeding. 
However, they do offer a pathway for navigating the difficult 
4 This depends on whether one accepts such higher-order uncertainties. Not 
everyone does: see Frank (2017) for a discussion of this. 
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interdisciplinary space between law and science. 
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